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ABSTRACT  
This article develops a research framework for the analysis of the politics of migration 
policy instruments. Policy instruments are seen as living instruments; they evolve and 
develop similar to moving targets. A scholar interested in this field of research may focus 
either on the establishment of a given instrument or on its use. The question of an 
instrument’s design relates to the policy transfer literature focusing on how certain 
policies move from one setting to another. In the context of a policy transfer, actors from 
the other - ‘receiving’ - institutional setting negotiate and, potentially, contest or 
reinterpret a policy instrument. The evolution of policy instruments once adopted in a 
specific institutional context is a second area of interest. The original goals can be diluted 
throughout the implementation process notably due to tensions between 
intergovernmental and supranational actors, or sticky institutionalization, which is 
characterized by path-dependencies. Often the choice of new instruments derives from an 
inefficiency or loss of credibility of past instruments. This editorial therefore seeks to 
make a twofold contribution: first it investigates the added-value of a policy instrument 
approach to the study of migration; second it furthers research on the external dimension 
of EU migration policy. 
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1. Introduction  
The better ‘governance’ of international migration has become a priority for the EU. An 
important element in the EU’s efforts to establish a common EU migration policy has 
been the strengthening of cooperation with third countries, in particular with migrant’s 
countries of origin. Since the early 2000s, the EU has agreed upon a range of migration 
policy instruments with third countries such as the Mobility Partnership and readmission 
agreements. Although each of these instruments is usually structured similarly, they also 
exhibit substantial differences in terms of both content and practical use. A case in point 
is the Mobility Partnership with Morocco signed in June 2013 that gives Moroccan 
authorities more leeway in defining priorities compared to the EU’s earlier Mobility 
Partnerships with Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. The question therefore 
arises: which factors determine the design and use of EU migration policy instruments?  
 
By focusing on the politics of migration policy instruments, this Special Issue brings 
together a set of contributions that seek to shed light on this and related questions. A 
particular emphasis is placed on the role and impact of third countries and international 
organizations in defining and applying EU migration policy instruments. What is the 
direction of influence between the EU, third countries and international organizations? 
How do the EU’s policy instruments in the migration field evolve in view of constant 
interactions with non-EU actors and institutions? These questions are relevant to the 
study of the governance of international migration at large given that policy instruments 
reflect wider norms that underpin such cooperation. 
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With this research focus, the Special Issue seeks to make a twofold contribution to the 
academic literature. A first objective is to investigate which kind of added value a policy 
instrument approach can offer to the study of migration. This approach has found 
increasing academic attention1, yet its application has so far been limited to few policy 
areas such as environment2 and common foreign and security policy3. A second objective 
is to contribute to the better understanding of the evolving dynamics of the external 
dimension of EU migration policy. The establishment of this external dimension has been 
closely followed by political observers and the academic community4. While building 
upon this knowledge, this Special Issue seeks to go one step further; it no longer focuses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (2007). Introduction: Understanding Public Policy 
through its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public 
Policy Instrumentation. Governance 20(1): 1-21, Le Galès, P. (2006). Special Issue of 
Governance: Understanding Public Policy Through Its Instruments, NewGov Deliverable 
9/D02. 
2 Bomberg, E. (2007). Policy learning in an enlarged European Union: environnemental 
NGOs and new policy instruments. Journal of European Public Policy 14(2): 248-68, 
Halpern, C. (2010). Governing Despite its Instruments? Instrumentation in EU 
Environmental Policy. West European Politics 33(1): 39-57. 
3 Menon, A. and Sedelmeier, U. (2010). Instruments and intentionality: civilian crisis 
management and enlargement conditionality in EU security policy. West European 
Politics 33(1): 75-92. 
4 See e.g. Lavenex, S. and Uçarer, E. M. (2002) Migration and the Externalities of 
European Integration, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford, Lexington Books; Lavenex, 
S. (2006). Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control. 
West European Politics 29(2): 329 - 51; Wolff, S., Wichmann, N. and Mounier, G. 
(2009). The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security 
Agenda for the EU? Journal of European Integration 31(1): 9-23; Sterkx, S. (2009). The 
External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Policy: Expanding Fortress Europe?, 
in: J. Orbie (ed.) Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, 
Burlington, Ashgate, pp 117-39; Haddad, E. (2008). The External Dimension of EU 
Refugee Policy: A new Approach to Asylum. Government and Opposition 43(2): 190-
205, Boswell, C. (2003). The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy. 
International Affairs 79(3): 619 - 38; Trauner, F. and Carrapico, H. (2012). The external 
dimension of EU justice and home affairs after the Lisbon Treaty: analysing the 
dynamics of expansion and diversification. European Foreign Affairs Review 17(Special 
Issue 2012): 165-82. 
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on the reasons why migration objectives found their way in EU external relations and/or 
‘contaminated’ other policy areas such as development. Rather, it is interested in how 
migration policy instruments once established in EU external relations evolve over time 
and in constant interactions with third countries and international organizations. With 
only few exceptions5, the EU’s external migration cooperation has been analyzed from a 
Eurocentric perspective, thereby neglecting the potential impact which non-EU actors 
may have on the evolution of an EU policy.  
 
This introductory article is structured in three parts. It starts by analyzing the different 
layers of migration governance (national/regional/international). The next and main 
section adapts the policy instrument approach for the purposes of the present research 
interest and clusters migration policy instruments in EU external relations. The editorial 
is concluded by situating the different contributions of the Special Issue in the politics of 
instrumentation.   
 
 
2. The different Layers of Migration Governance  
 
The presentation of the different layers of migration governance is relevant as policy 
instruments often migrate between the layers (national/regional/international). In the case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See e.g. Reslow, N. (2012). The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy: The 
Mobility Partnerships. European Journal of Migration and Law 14(4): 393-415; Betts, A. 
and Milner, J. (2006). The externalisation of EU asylum policy: the position of African 
states, Working Paper No. 36, Oxford University. 
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of the EU, for instance, many policy instruments have their origin either at the national or 
the international level.  
 
 
2.1.The national level  
 
Nation states have remained central actors in the governance of international migration. 
In many cases, migration-related arrangements are concluded only between a country of 
migrants’ origin and a country of destination. Labor migration, in particular, has 
remained a field that is regulated in bilateral relations or in a unilateral form (meaning 
that migrant receiving states choose who they admit into their territory, with little or no 
influence from the migrant sending countries). In Europe, several states have been very 
active in signing bilateral agreements, in particular with migrants’ sending countries in 
Africa. Important examples of bilateral partnerships have been Italy-Libya, France-Mali, 
France-Senegal, Denmark-Kenya and the UK-Tanzania 6 . Linking migration-related 
issues to development aid and trade, these agreements have often sought to engage the 
migrant sending countries in the control of unwanted migration through readmission 
agreements and capacity building.  
 
The national level has also been of high relevance for EU migration policy. At the 
beginning of the European cooperation, the EU level was not meant to take away 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Betts, A. (2011). The global governance of migration and the role of trans-regionalism, 
in: R. Kunz, S. Lavenex and M. Panizzon (eds.) Multilayered Migration Governance. The 
Promise of Partnership, Oxon, Routledge, pp 23-46. 
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decision-making competences from the national level. Cooperation was rather designed 
to shield an epistemic community (namely security-oriented actors from ministries of the 
interior of member states) from constraints exerted by constitutions, jurisprudence and 
laws at the national level. The EU provided these actors with ‘venues of decision-
making’ in which they were protected from domestic and European actors with other 
preferences7. Many policies adopted at EU level were of a restrictive nature and aimed at 
reducing the number of irregular migrants and (bogus) asylum seekers8. With the gradual 
communitarisation of EU Justice and Home Affairs, the EU’s role in immigration and 
asylum has been changing and other actors such as the European Commission or the 
European Parliament have gained influence9. Still, member states and transgovernmental 
networks of law enforcement officials have remained particularly powerful in the process 
of externalizing EU migration policies10.  
   
 
2.2.The regional level  
 
International migration management often takes place in a regional context, also due to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Guiraudon, V. (2000). European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-
making as Venue Shopping. Journal of Common Market Studies 38(2): 251 - 71, Joppke, 
C. (1998). Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration. World Politics 50(2): 266-
93, Guiraudon, V. and Lahav, G. (2000). A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate. 
The Case of Migration Control. Comparative Political Studies 33(2). 
8  Guild, E. (2006). The Europeanisation of Europe's Asylum Policy. International 
Journal of Refugee Law 18(3-4): 630-51, Geddes, A. (2008) Immigration and European 
Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe?, Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
9 Kaunert, C. and Léonard, S. (2012). The development of the EU asylum policy: venue-
shopping in perspective. Journal of European Public Policy 19(9): 1396-413. 
10 Lavenex, S. (2006). Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration 
Control. West European Politics 29(2): 329 - 51. 
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the fact that migration flows often exhibit regional patterns (e.g. Central American and 
Mexican migrants coming to the United States).  
 
The wording ‘regional context’ can be understood in a twofold way. First, it can imply 
that countries within one region seek to find common responses to international migration 
challenges. This may involve the delegation of legal competences to a regional 
organization such as the European Union. In the case of the EU, this has happened with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) which incorporated the Schengen rules and regulations 
into the EU’s legislative framework and transferred immigration and asylum, along with 
visa, external border controls and civil law matters, from the intergovernmental ‘Justice 
and Home Affairs’ Pillar to the ‘European Community’ Pillar. With these new 
competences, the European Council quickly called for the development of ‘a common 
EU asylum and migration policy’, including measures aimed at establishing a 
‘partnership’ with countries of origin, ensuring fair treatment of third country nationals 
legally residing in the EU, creating common asylum procedures and rules and better 
controlling irregular migration11. However, measures on legal migration did not feature 
high on this agenda given that the heads of state and governments had been reluctant to 
give away any decision-making power in this field. Until the Lisbon Treaty, decisions on 
legal migration required unanimity. While the EU is the regional organization with the 
farthest-reaching legal competences in the field, other regional entities such as the 
African Union (AU) or MERCOSUR in South America also increasingly deal with 
migration-related challenges. Their approach towards migration, however, may differ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 European Council (1999). Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999. 
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from the EU. The African Union, for instance, is less concerned with issues of irregular 
migration than with the well-being of the African Diaspora.   
 
Second, regional context can also imply that the governance of international migration 
increasingly takes place in trans-regional frameworks. ‘Trans-regionalism’ has become a 
prominent governance mode in relation to irregular migration and, to some extent, labor 
migration12. In so doing, migrants’ receiving states, in particular in Europe, the US and 
Australia, have stopped waiting (passively) until a migrant has reached the borders of 
their territory. ‘Rather, they have increasingly sought to exert extra-territorial authority in 
order to shape the movement of people within or from other regions in the world’13. 
Policy instruments and norms are sometimes the result of the influence of the 
transnational networks that may consist of NGOs or regional inter-state organizations 
such as the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Of 
relevance have also been (loosely institutionalized) inter-state dialogues such as the 
High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, the International 
Conference of Population and Development or the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development. They may end up or relate to regional consultative processes such as the 
Budapest Process, the Mediterranean Transit Dialogue, or the South American 
Conference on Migration14.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Betts, A. (2011). see note 6. 
13 Betts, A. (2011). see note 6, at p. 32. 
14 Thouez, C. and Channac, F. (2006). Shaping International Migration Policy: the Role 
of Regional Consultative Processes. West European Politics 29(2): 370-87. 
Please cite as : Trauner, Florian and Sarah Wolff (2014): The negotiation and contestation of EU migration 
policy instruments – a research framework. In: European Journal of Migration and Law, 16 (1), 1-18.  
 	  
	   9 
2.3. The international/global level  
 
‘Migration has become global but there is no global regime to govern the international 
movement of persons’. This statement by Philippe Fargues15 refers to the fact that there is 
no migration law that can be considered of global reach. The existing regime is complex, 
multilayered and consists of international, regional and trans-national treaties as well as 
bilateral arrangements16. Although migration law has been codified to some extent at the 
international level, it has not been accompanied by a corresponding international 
architecture. According to Alexander Aleinikoff 17 , there is ‘substance without 
architecture’. This does not imply that international organizations (IO) have not dealt 
with migration-related issues. On the contrary, many IOs such as the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have 
dealt exclusively or partially with aspects of migration governance. These organizations, 
however, have primarily provided their member states with services and advice. 
Regardless of the many international initiatives in the migration field, the willingness of 
nation states to subscribe to legally binding international norms has been limited. In 
Bett’s analysis of global migration governance, multilateralism through international 
organizations is only a ‘thin layer’.  In several cases, however, migration issues are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Fargues, P. (ed.) (2010). Understanding Human Migration. Florence, European Union 
Institute, at p. 18. 
16  Kunz, R., Lavenex, S. and Panizzon, M. (eds.) (2011). Multilayered Migration 
Management: The Promise of Partnership, London, Routledge. 
17 Aleinikoff, T. A. (2007). International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance without 
Architecture, in: R. Cholewinski, R. Perruchoud and E. MacDonald (eds.) International 
Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges, The Hague, TMC Asser 
Press, pp 467-79. 
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‘embedded’ in the work of international organizations and/or in international norms, 
without being explicitly monitored by migration institutions18.  
 
Two main narratives - ‘migration management’ and ‘migration-development nexus’ - 
dominate the global discourse and therefore norms and policy instruments. The first 
discourse concerns the need to manage or control migration fluxes, while the other insists 
upon the need to take into account the development roots and benefits of migration. It is 
interesting to note that the EU, in spite of its governance specificities, mirrors these 
discourses. Inspired by the New Public Management discourse, the ‘migration 
management’ view has been criticized for lacking an ethical dimension19. The second 
narrative focuses more on the ‘migration-development nexus’. A key assumption here is 
that the more targeted use of development aid and trade can contribute to reducing 
permanent migration20. The potential of migrants has also moved to the centre of 
attention. Contrary to earlier discussions that assumed migration has a negative impact on 
the development of a country (in particular through ‘brain drain’), a new consensus 
emerged in the 1990s highlighting the aspect of ‘co-development’ and the potential of the 
transnational engagement of migrants in the development of their home societies21.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Betts, A. (2010). Global Migration Governance - the Emergence of a New Debate, 
Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford. 
19 Barrero-Zapata, R. (2012). European Migration Governance: From “Anything Goes” to 
the Need for an Ethical Code American Behavioral Scientist 56(9): 1183-203, Geiger, M. 
and Pecoud, A. (2012) The politics of international migration management, London, 
Palgrave. 
20 De Haas, H. (2007). Turning the Tide? Why development will not stop migration. 
Development and Change 38(5): 819-41. 
21 Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Van Hear, N. and Endberg-Pederson, P. (2002). The Migration-
Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. International Migration 40(5): 49-
Please cite as : Trauner, Florian and Sarah Wolff (2014): The negotiation and contestation of EU migration 
policy instruments – a research framework. In: European Journal of Migration and Law, 16 (1), 1-18.  
 	  
	   11 
 
 
 
3. Understanding EU Migration Policy Instruments   
 
This section presents the analytical framework upon which the articles contributing to 
this Special Issue build. It starts by highlighting the benefits of a policy instrument 
approach to understand the dynamics of international migration governance. It then looks 
how these instruments are being diffused or developed within the context of EU 
migration policy and proposes a typology of migration policy instruments.  
 
3.1. The added-value of a policy instrument approach 
 
The policy instrument approach in public policy is tightly linked to the booming literature 
on new governance dealing with non-hierarchical, soft, and informal modes of policy-
making. In the quest for ‘better governance’, traditional policy instruments such as 
legislation, constitutions and regulations have been challenged by the need to 
accommodate a wider range of interests and stakeholders. The above-mentioned layers of 
international migration governance have multiplied the spaces, regions and arenas where 
policy instruments are designed, contested and implemented. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150, Faist, T., Fauser, M. and Kivisto, P. (eds.) (2011). The migration-development 
nexus: a transnational perspective, Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
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There are two strands of the literature for the study of policy instruments. The first one, 
borrowing from economics, adopts a rational-choice inspired analysis of policy 
instruments. It focuses on researching how instruments are able to efficiently reach their 
objectives, often relying on a cost-benefit analysis. It sees policy instruments as 
pragmatic tools to solve public policy issues at the functional disposal of policy-makers. 
Usually ‘policy instruments are widely seen as being substitutable’ and ‘public policy is 
thus a toolbox from which the optimal tools are (or should be) selected’ leading to the 
best possible outcome through an ideal ‘policy mix’ of instruments22. This rational 
approach, however, does not focus on the ‘politics’ of instrumentation and the way 
instruments can be contested over time and evolve depending on the context.  
 
This is more the focus of a second strand of literature that sees policy instruments as ‘a 
condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it’23. Far from 
being ‘neutral devices’, they are contested and the object of dynamics of politicization, 
de-politicization and connected to issues of legitimacy. In this light, policy instruments 
are defined as ‘a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social 
relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations 
and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the 
generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and 
sustained by a concept of regulation’24. A focus on the politics of instrumentations hence 
implies to look at the drivers behind the choices of instruments as well as the structure of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Flanagan, K., Uyarra, E. and Laranje, M. (2011). Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ 
for innovation. Research Policy 40(702-713). 
23 Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (2007). see note 1, at p. 1. 
24 Le Galès, P. (2006). see note 1, at p. 8. 
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a public policy25.  
 
This has been well demonstrated in the case of so-called EU ‘new environmental policy 
instruments’ (NEPI)26. NEPIs were introduced in the form of market-based instruments, 
voluntary agreements, and emission trading schemes to cope with weaknesses of 
traditional EU environmental policy-making (e.g. weak enforcement) 27 . While the 
innovative character of those new instruments is often put forward, observers often 
neglect why specific instruments are adopted in specific situations or how they evolve 
over time28. Often EU institutions borrow seemingly ‘new’ policy instruments from the 
national or international level in order to ‘legitimise [their] environmental competence’29. 
Halpern argues that NEPI were more useful in structuring the policy than achieving 
particular objectives. They were instrumental in providing specific groups with access to 
EU policy-making, addressing new issues and improving coordination. Information-
based and consultative instruments have thus been useful in ‘structuring forms of 
production of knowledge and expertise’30.  
 
Few studies have applied this research lens for other areas such as migration and EU 
external relations, let alone looked at the role of non-EU actors in the politics of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Le Galès, P. (2006). Ibid.  
26 Bomberg, E. (2007). Policy learning in an enlarged European Union: enviornmental 
NGOs and new policy instruments. Journal of European Public Policy 14(2): 248-68, 
Jordan, A. and Lenschow, A. (eds.) (2008). Innovation in Enviornmental Policy? 
Integrating the Environment, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
27 Halpern, C. (2010). see note 2 at p. 40, Bomberg, E. (2007). see note 2, at p. 248. 
28 Halpern, C. (2010). see note 2, at p. 40. 
29 Halpern, C. (2010). see note 2, at p. 46. 
30 Ibid. 
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instrumentation. An exception is the work of Menon and Sedelmeier31 for EU security 
policy, investigating the cases of crisis management and enlargement conditionality. 
Another study using the policy instrument approach is the one of Farrell32. She looks at 
the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements as policy instruments, and 
highlights the pressures that transnational civil society exerted on the European 
Commission’s proposal. The introduction of new policy instruments was the direct 
consequence of mounting criticism on the Lomé Convention. Following Peter Hall’s 
typology of change and social learning, Farrell identifies a ‘first order change’ with the 
EU’s change of instrument (from Lomé to Cotonou); a ‘second order change’ with the 
introduction of new policy instruments such as Economic Partnership Agreements33. The 
‘third order change’, which should lead to a paradigmatic change, however, was not 
identified. The EU retained its core beliefs of normative power, and kept third countries 
somewhat excluded from the process.  
 
The studies applying the policy instrument approach so far have hence focused on the 
politics of instrumentation within the EU and on the EU as an actor or regionalism. The 
role and influence of external actors, e.g. if they mobilize against EU’s policy 
instruments, are under-researched. Studies also often lack a dimension of temporality - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Menon, A. and Sedelmeier, U. (2010). Instruments and intentionality: civilian crisis 
management and enlargement conditionality in EU security policy. West European 
Politics 33(1): 75-92. 
32 Farrell, M. (2009). EU policy towards other regions: policy learning in the external 
promotion of regional integration. Journal of European Public Policy 16(8): 1165-84. 
33 Farrell, M. (2009). Ibid, at p. 1177. 
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how policy instrument evolve over time34. 
 
 
3.2. Defining EU migration policy instruments 
 
This Special Issue adheres to Lascoumes and Le Galès’ understanding that policy 
instruments are not neutral but carry meanings about politics, knowledge and social 
control (see above). Therefore, a policy instrument has both an ideational and a 
functional dimension. The ideational dimension relates to the objectives and norms that 
underpin a given policy instrument. In this context, norms are understood as ‘a standard 
of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ - basically what actors consider 
as normal or appropriate behavior35. The functional dimension concerns the way in which 
the actors seek to translate these objectives and norms into outcomes. In doing so, they 
first establish and then apply specific rules and technical tools.  
 
Let us exemplify this understanding of policy instruments for the case of EU readmission 
agreements. Such an agreement presents the legal codification of a concrete objective of 
EU migration policy – that is to establish a ‘credible’ EU migration policy that is 
‘capable of reacting in case of abuse’36. These objectives are informed by wider societal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 But see Geddes, A. (2005). Europe's Border Relationships and International Migration 
Relations. Journal of Common Market Studies 43(4): 787-806, at p. 799. 
35 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. International Organization 52: 887-917, at p. 891. 
36 See e.g. Commission of the European Communities (2002). Green Paper on a 
Community Return Policy on illegal Residents, Brussels, COM (2002)175, 10 April 
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norms and developments. In the literature, it is well-established that (and how) migration 
has become ‘securitized’ and transformed into a ‘law-and-order’ issue. This implies that 
migration has increasingly been framed as a threat to a country’s social, economic and 
political stability37. In the present case, therefore, the increasing relevance of a societal 
perception towards migration (migrants as ‘security threats’) has found its expression in 
the EU objective of ‘fighting illegal migration’. This is to be achieved by signing EU 
readmission agreements with third countries. The very use of this legal device, however, 
not only depends on the way it was set-up (e.g. does the agreement include a ‘third-
country-national clause’ or not?), but also on the ways in which the contracting parties 
employ it. A third country may contest an EU readmission agreement not only in the 
negotiation process but also in the implementation phase e.g. by systematically 
disapproving the certificates and documents provided by EU member states in the context 
of a return. This practical experience of cooperation feeds back into how the EU defines 
its policy objectives and instruments. In a long-term perspective, it may even impact the 
societal norms and objectives underpinning migration policy.  
 
The Special Issue therefore builds upon the understanding that policy instruments are 
living instruments; they evolve and develop similar to moving targets. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002; Council of the European Union (2002). Co-operation with third countries of origin 
and transit to jointly combat illegal immigration, Brussels, 9917/3/02. 
37 See, among others, Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of 
Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies 38(5): 751 - 77. 
Figure 1: Conceptualising a policy instrument 
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implementation 
practice 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A researcher interested in policy instruments may focus either on the establishment of a 
given instrument or on its use. Depending on which of these two time-phases one is 
interested in, different research questions may guide the enquiry: 
 
• With regard to the establishment/design of a policy instrument: 
Which objectives does a policy instrument seek to achieve? What are the norms and 
values that inform these objectives? Which factors impact the negotiation process of a 
given policy instrument? Has a particular policy instrument been developed in or 
migrated from another setting/governance level? Why do actors adopt particular policy 
instruments at a certain time and not others? And, with regard to the migration policy 
instrument that builds upon the cooperation with non-EU actors, what has been the 
impact of third countries and/or international organizations in the negotiations of the EU 
policy instrument? Have external actors exerted any influence over the design of the 
instrument and how? 
 
• With regard to the use of a policy instrument: 
Rationale 
(objectives, norms 
finalité) 
Rule/tool 
(codification of 
rationale) 
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Which factors characterize the use and application of a policy instrument? To what extent 
are they actually used? How can one evaluate the success or the failure of a policy 
instrument? How is a policy instrument that is originally developed in a different 
setting/governance layer interpreted/transferred into another institutional context?  What 
are forms of contestation towards a certain instrument?  
 
While many of these research questions are addressed in the different contributions, they 
open up further and other avenues of research beyond this Special Issue. An intriguing 
aspect possibly addressed in further research is that some of the EU’s policy instruments, 
often recently created, are hardly used by member states, which prefer to rely on existing 
bilateral instruments. For instance, the Commission complained in its evaluation of EU 
Readmission Agreements (EURA) that the ‘inconsistent application of EURAs 
undermines greatly the credibility of the EU Readmission Policy towards the third 
countries, which are expected to apply the EURA correctly’38. Similarly, at the level of 
operational cooperation, bilateral patrolling between the Spanish Guardia civil and the 
Moroccan gendarmerie or between the Italian Guardia di Finanza and the Libyan 
authorities might be privileged over a coordinated Frontex operation. 
 
 
3.3. A typology of EU migration policy instruments 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  European Commission (2011). Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements. 
COM(2011) 76 final, 23 February 2011, at p. 5. 
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A typology of migration policy instruments used in EU external relations includes 
agreement- and incentive based instruments, operational and practical support, and 
international law and norms development. It is important to highlight, however, that the 
boundaries between the different categories are at times quite blurry. When signing an 
EU readmission agreement, for instance, a third country often receives enhanced 
operational and financial support as well as facilitated travel opportunities for its 
citizens39. Immigration control agreements (or migration clauses in other EU agreements) 
are often linked to trade concessions and/or development aid. In many instances, this kind 
of arrangement is embedded into broader strategic frameworks of cooperation 40 . 
International law is a category on its own. The EU’s objective of actively contributing to 
the development of international norms and principles in the area of asylum and 
migration is a relatively recent one, e.g. spelled out in the 2005 EU strategy for external 
action in JHA41.  In practice, however, the EU and its member states are often more 
concerned with how to accommodate already existing international laws and principles 
within its national and European structures than with developing new ones.42   
 
 
Table 1: Migration policy instruments in EU external relations 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Trauner, F. and Kruse, I. (2008). EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A 
New Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool? European Journal of Migration and Law 10(4): 
411-38. 
40  Cassarino, J.-P. (2007). Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU 
Neighbourhood. The International Spectator 42(2): 179-96. 
41 Council of the European Union (2005). A strategy for the External Action of JHA: 
Global Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels, 15446/05, 6 December 2005. 
42 See Roos and Zaun, this issue. 
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Type Instrument Objective Origin/forerunners 
Agreement-based and 
incentive-based 
 
 EU readmission 
agreement  
Regulation of return 
procedures of migrants in 
irregular situations  
National; first European 
agreements signed in early 
19th century  
 EU visa facilitation 
agreement 
Facilitated application 
procedures for Schengen 
visas  
National; e.g. United 
States Visa Waiver 
Programm was created in 
1986  Visa Free Dialogues  Achieving full visa 
liberalization for the 
Schengen area 
 Embedded migration 
clauses 
Migration-related clauses 
in EU Association, 
Development and Trade 
Agreements 
National and international; 
e.g. General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATS) of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) 
 Circular migration  Temporary work and 
resident permits for 
migrant worker 
National; e.g. German 
Gastarbeiter Programme 
 Mobility Partnership Framework for regulating 
legal migration 
National;  
 Aid Programmes Capacity building and 
tackle ‘root causes’ of 
migration 
National; 
Information-based and 
operational support 
 
 Practical cooperation e.g. cooperation on 
‘country of origin’ 
information, FRONTEX 
operational support for 
border management and 
migration control 
National and regional (e.g. 
Regional Consultative 
Processes)  
International Law  
 International norms and 
conventions 
EU coordination in Int. 
Organizations to develop 
international norms and 
conventions 
 
Source : own elaboration; inspired from Halpern43  
 
The table shows that most of the EU’s migration policy instruments build upon or are 
inspired by national or international forerunners. For instance, the historical roots of 
European readmission agreements lie in the early nineteenth century when Prussia first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Halpern, C. (2010). see note 2, at p. 43-44. 
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signed such agreements with other German States in 1818 and 1819.44 Circular migration 
schemes have been a long-standing instrument used by some member states before it 
found access to the EU’s toolbox of policy instruments. Examples thereof include the 
Noria principle in France, the Gastarbeiter programme in Germany and other guest 
worker systems.  
 
 
4. The politics of instrumentation and the Special issue  
 
The politics of instrumentation differ according to which time-phase one analyses. Each 
of the contributions of this Special Issue focuses either on a policy instrument’s inception 
or on its evolution.    
 
Given that many migration policy instruments migrate from one governance level to 
another, the question of an instrument’s design relates to the policy transfer literature 
focusing on how certain policies move from one setting to another. Diffusion has been 
defined as ‘the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among members of a social system’45. Policy innovation and transfer may be 
actively promoted by external actors – yet it may also be the result of more unintended 
consequences or parallel developments e.g. between two regional organization such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Coleman, N. (2009) European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and 
Refugee Rights, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at p. 12. 
45 Berry and Berry quoted in Stone, D. (2008). Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy 
Communities, and Their Networks. The Policy Studies Journal 36(1), at p. 546. 
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Mercosur and the EU.46 Many of the EU’s external effects are not necessarily intentional 
by nature but also stem from unintended side effects of the EU’s internal regime. Sandra 
Lavenex and Emek Uçarer47 therefore introduce the term ‘externalities’ from economics 
for analyzing the whole range of ways in which the EU impacts third countries and 
international organizations. They maintain that ‘the external effects of European policies 
take place along a continuum that runs from voluntary to more constrained forms of 
adaptation, and include a variety of modes such as unilateral emulation, adaptation by 
externality, and policy transfer through conditionality’48.  
 
In the context of a policy transfer, actors from the other - ‘receiving’ - institutional setting 
negotiate and, potentially, contest or reinterpret a policy instrument. This process may 
alter both the instruments’ ideational (meaning and rationale) and the functional 
dimension. From a theoretical perspective, actors’ reactions to a policy instrument with a 
foreign origin may be best explained either according to a logic of appropriateness or 
according to a logic of consequentiality49. According to the logic of consequentiality, the 
transfer of a policy instrument provides actors with new or enhanced opportunities to 
pursue their interests and to shift the balance of power in favour of their preference50. A 
logic of appropriateness considers a wider normative environment in which actors behave 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Acosta and Geddes, this issue 
47 Lavenex, S. and Uçarer, E. M. (2002) Migration and the Externalities of European 
Integration, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford, Lexington Books. 
48 Lavenex, S. and Uçarer, E. M. (2004). The External Dimension of Europeanization: 
The Case of Immigration Policies. Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association 39(4): 417 - 43, at p. 417. 
49 March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders. International Organisation 52(4): 943 - 69. 
50 North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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and choose the policy option that is considered most legitimate51. The pre-existing 
structures and local agents become key in negotiating and ‘localizing’ international 
norms and rules. This can even lead to a policy instrument’s modifications ‘in accordance 
with their preconstructed normative beliefs and practices’52. Path dependencies, the 
structure of domestic institutions and pre-existing norms are hence of particular relevance 
for compliant or non-compliant behaviour53. New policy instruments will ‘never enter a 
normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they 
must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest’54.  
 
Inspired from these theoretical perspectives, Cassarino55 offers a telling account on how 
the Tunisian government selectively incorporated elements of the EU’s migration policy 
toolbox in order to enhance its own strategic options with regard to surveillance and 
control. Whereas this example can be explained from a rational-choice perspective, a 
constructivist lens offers important insights in other instances. According to Wolff 56, the 
issue of appropriate behavior has been of strong relevance in the EU´s readmission 
negotiations with Turkey and Morocco. Acosta and Geddes57 show that the normative 
underpinnings of EU migration policy have been contested in the framework of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1998). see note 49. 
52 Acharya, A. (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and 
Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. International Organization 58: 239-75, at p. 
269. 
53 Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why comply? Social learning and European Identity Change. 
International Organization 55(3): 553 - 88. 
54 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. International Organization 52: 887-917, at p. 897. 
55 This issue.  
56 This issue.  
57 This issue.  
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Mercusor cooperation. In fact, this contestation and opposition to EU migration norms 
has influenced the development of a more liberal approach towards migration in South 
America. 
 
The evolution of policy instruments once adopted in a specific institutional context is a 
second area of interest. The politics of instrumentation of EU migration governance, 
especially with third countries, is a complex process. The original goals can be diluted 
throughout the implementation process notably due to tensions between 
intergovernmental and supranational actors, or sticky institutionalization, which is 
characterized by path-dependencies58. Often the choice of new instruments derives from 
an inefficiency or loss of credibility of past instruments. This is true for the case of EU 
enlargement conditionality and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); it 
appeared at the beginning of the 1990s as a solution to new security challenges posed to 
Europe, in particular the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, and also to restructure the relationship 
between the EU and NATO after the fall of the Berlin wall59. However, eventually, the 
ESDP’s goals and structure came to revolve mostly around civilian crisis management 
objectives. ‘Similarly, there was never a strategic collective EU decision taken to use 
enlargement as a tool of security policy. Rather conditionality emerged as a by-product of 
a highly contested process leading to the EU’s eastern enlargement, in which different 
actors pursued competing objectives’60. Thus, the purpose and structure of a specific 
instrument can be diluted throughout the policy-making process and may have different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Wolff, S. (2012) The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union's Internal 
Security, Houndmills, Palgrave. 
59 Menon, A. and Sedelmeier, U. (2010), see note 3, at p. 82. 
60 Ibid.  
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outcomes than those originally intended. In the field of migration policy instruments, 
such unintended consequences have been identified in the case of the Western Balkans61. 
The increase of asylum applications originating from the Western Balkans was not 
foreseen by EU member states and made them revise their approach on how to grant (and 
maintain) visa-free travel.  
 
Finally, bilateral relations of member states as well as the international/global level as 
discussed above may also turn out to be a constraint (or, on the contrary, an inspiration) 
for EU migration policy instruments. External actors and the intended recipients of those 
policy instruments exert another potential influence. With regard to the EU’s instrument 
of mobility partnership, for instance, third countries such as Senegal and Cape Verde 
have not ‘merely been passive recipients of policy proposals’ but actively sought to 
influence the EU’s policy outcomes62. Morocco and Turkey have sought to discuss visa 
facilitation and liberalization by behaving as hard bargainers63. International rules and 
conventions have turned out to be an inspiration for EU migration policies and been 
incorporated, in different ways, into EU law64.  
 
With their different empirical foci, the authors provide for detailed and rich insights into 
the politics of migration policy instruments and contribute to our understanding of this 
important aspect of EU external migration relations. Certainly, they cannot (and do not 
seek to) provide an answer to all the research questions identified in this editorial. The 	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Special Issue understands itself as an endeavor to open up a new field of migration 
research, inviting other scholars to go in a similar direction and further deepen our 
knowledge.  
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